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ABSTRACT
GROWTH OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES
IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
by Tu K. Tran
This thesis addresses the topic of the spontaneous nature of market emergence. It
examines the situation surrounding the creation of joint stock companies in the Tudor
period in England, the reason for their formation, how they operated and the success and
failure of their operations.
Two prominent hypotheses on the development of joint stock companies are
explored. The first theory expresses the governement's pivotal role in enabling markets.
The second theory posits that companies formed from private directives independent of
state involvement.
This thesis studies the extent to which the state was involved in enabling markets
by reviewing historical records and publications on three prominent joint stock
companies from an economic point of view. Research on the Muscovy Company, the
East India Company, and the Virginia Company supports that the second hypothesis is
not only plausible, but likely the case.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
The state's role in enabling markets has been a topic of great debate. Discussions

on markets have revolved around the development of joint stock companies. Two
hypotheses emerged from this debate. The first hypothesis is that state involvement is
essential to enabling markets. This school theorized that the government created state
charters that directed the formation of a corporation. For the purposes of this thesis, the
hypothesis will be referred to as the government directive school. The second hypothesis
is that markets emerged spontaneously without the state. Supporters of the second theory
posit that corporations can thrive without a state charter. The second hypothesis will be
referred to throughout this thesis as the private enterprise directive school.
Both hypotheses are plausible on initial observation. However, a closer
examination of historical records and analyzing them from an economic point of view
may reveal that one hypothesis is more likely. This paper's aim is to examine the extent
to which joint stock corporations emerged without government involvement. Support for
this thesis is achieved by reviewing historical records and other published works.

1.1.

The Government Directive Hypothesis
The modern corporation is heavily regulated by the state. Since regulation has

been a prominent tradition in the modern corporation, this can be extrapolated to mean
that regulation is key to enabling markets. Many people believe that markets could not
function without regulation from the state.
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However, government directive alone does not make a corporation the creation of
the state. The corporations' existence, "authorized by law," makes it a creature of the
state (Bliss and Binder 313). For this reason, Landau and Krueger hypothesized that
early mercantile associations were strictly "a creature of the state and exist only by a
virtue of a charter granted by the state" (Landau and Krueger 6). By association the
modern corporation could not exist without government involvement.
Their similarities advocate that today's corporations evolved from the early
trading companies. The modern corporation's successful operations under state
regulation imply that government involvement has always been a necessary requirement.
Thomas and Rosita Rourke purported that some national-level regulation is needed
because of "the tendency for corporations to avoid accountability" (Rourke and Rourke
135). This theme is common across publications in support of state regulation of the
modern corporation. Evidence in support of state regulation extends beyond the recent
occurrences because "it was the general opinion a hundred years ago that corporations or
joint-stock companies could not succeed [without state recognition]" (Bliss and Binder
313).
Other proponents of this school suggest that the Crown was a key figure in the
emergence of joint stock corporations. The financial enterprise created by individual
businessmen provided monetary support for distant trade voyages, but the privileges
granted unto them by the Royal Charters were responsible for their continued success

(Klein, Ragg and Rabb 47-99).

These charters granted the monopoly on trade to

merchants in regions under the state's jurisdiction. This prohibited other companies from

3

impinging on their trading grounds, thus securing the trade transactions for the companies
possessing a royal charter.
The Crown's role in commerce began with Henry VII. In 1485, at a time when
"England as a country were weak and poor[,] Henry the VII fostering trade was able to
add to the revenue and build up the industries of the country" (Herrick 207). The
Crown's self-interested role was no more evident than the fact that "the queen herself was
stockholder and part owner in many of these trading voyages" (Homans and Dana 504).
This marked the beginning of England's growth in trade activities. Thereafter, the Crown
no longer relied on foreign vessels to carry out trades.
One of the most prominent and influential supporters of this point of view is Niall
Fergusson of Harvard University. Ferguson explored the extent to which government
directive enabled markets in his 2001 publication, The Cash Nexus.

The inherent

message demonstrated by Ferguson in The Cash Nexus was that institutions are vital to
every activity, economic, political or otherwise. In that sense, markets cannot operate
without the right institutional framework.
According to Ferguson, joint stock corporations were created by the Crown,
which was the pivotal institutional framework during this time. Therefore, they were
responsible for the emergence of joint stock corporations.

Similarities between the

modern market and the Tudor joint stock corporations suggest that there is a genealogy
connection between the two.

By association, the Crown was responsible for the

development of the present complex markets.
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Fergusson's institution-dependent market operations were further explored in his
political book, Empire. Fergusson's hypothesis goes even further to suggest that the
British Empire was responsible for the global market economy. This publication puts the
discussion of state institutions on a global scale by attributing market success to the
Crown. Another of Ferguson's publications, The House of Rothschild, also attributes the
creation of markets to already existing institutions. The main hypothesis in his book was
that institutional power negotiated to the formation and reformation markets. Thus,
according to Fergusson, the Crown was responsible for formalizing market operations
that fostered thriving corporations. Though the Crown sought to share in the revenues
from market activities, it was their policies and regulations that made market success
possible.1 Rightfully, the Crown should take part in the revenues that it created.

1.2.

The Private Enterprise Directive Hypothesis
Despite the convincing arguments in favor of government creation theory, Niall

Fergusson's disregarded the possibility that these corporations can evolve spontaneously
and independent of state intervention.

The prospect that markets can emerge

spontaneously is an important facet to examine.
Supporters of this school of thought asserted that self regulation was the precursor
to government directive in markets. This hypothesis suggests that markets emerged
1

In 1485, the Crown recognized the importance of the sea as routes for future trade; shipbuilding was
extensively carried on in the days of Elizabeth. The Crown's interest in enhancing trade activities on the
waterways developed international trade. Thereafter, foreign merchants no longer dominated trade in the
British ports. The Crown's concentration on trade on the waterway led to increasing profits for merchant
companies and the Crown. (Herrick, 1920)
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spontaneously without formal state regulation. It was only after markets developed and
proved to be successful that the state took notice in market activities. The state's selfinterested goals led to creations of policies aimed at extracting a share of the market
profits.

Kingsbury, Herrick, Cheyney, Lingelback and scholars have addressed this

prospect by presenting evidence in support of the spontaneous emergence of joint stock
corporations. Kingsbury asserted that the advancement of joint stock corporations were
"due chiefly to private enterprise" (Kingsbury 11). Kingsbury further attributed the
ancestry to one specific company.

In her 1905 publication, she asserted that "the

Muscovy Company stands as a connecting link between the ideas of the explorer and
those of the trader" (Kingsbury 14).
There is a strong resemblance between the modern joint stock corporation and
those of the sixteenth century. This similarity convincingly established that the joint
stock companies of the sixteenth century evolved into the present business enterprises.
Not only was the Crown's involvement irrelevant to the creation of joint stock
companies, but the Crown's political strategies became more of a burden to the joint
stock company's growth.

The monopoly strategies favored by the Crown on many

occasions were undiplomatic. Their disregard for diplomacy in rejecting the Muscovy
Company's "proposed alliance with Russia" offended Russian dignitaries (Kotilaine 95).
The Crown made similar restrictive policies against other nations, which motivated
retaliatory restrictive policies against them.

One possible support for the spontaneous emergence hypothesis comes from the
Crown imposing restrictions for granting charters to domestic companies. The Crown
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asserted, on many occasions, that companies cannot acquire a charter unless they have
proven themselves a success. Companies wishing to acquire a royal charter can prove
their success by way of acquiring significant capital structure. The Crown believed that
the more a company embarked on distant voyages, the higher the possibility for profit.
Rules of business depict that only companies with great potential for success can attract
capital for multiple voyages. Combined, these two rules suggest that companies with a
high level of capital structure can fund multiple voyages, which may increase their
likelihood for success. The Crown took interest only in companies with strong capital
structures. Their interest led to the review and approval of a royal trade charter. The
charter requirement for companies to first demonstrate success strongly established that
joint stock companies evolved spontaneously.
The initial emergence of joint stock companies was parlayed through brotherhood
for the advancement of mutually beneficial transactions. The Merchant Adventures of
England was one of the first organizations that were "officially acknowledged, though
indirectly recognized by act of parliament" (Lingelback xxii). Established in the late
sixteenth century, The Merchant Adventures of England was more commonly known as
the Muscovy Company. There formal organization before parliament reorganization
shows that "a fellowship or fraternity existed among the Adventures long before we find
them so spoken of in an official instrument of the political powers" (Lingelbach xxiii). It
was these associations that fostered profitable trade enterprises. After demonstrating the

potential for success, these companies were then able to apply for a royal charter. Since
these companies must first develop into a thriving enterprise, the Crown's involvement
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was not essential to the creation and growth of trade companies. This goes against
Fergusson's argument that the State was the force behind the creation of markets.
Conclusions for the spontaneous emergence of joint stock companies can be
drawn from examples found in the Tudor period in England. However, a similar
association existed in the Middle Ages. This connection suggests that "the partnership
that lies behind the modern business firm that stands before the management corporation
that gave rise to the multinational corporation [can] be traced back to the Middle Ages"
(Weber xv).

1.3.

Evidence Supporting Each Hypothesis and an Explanation for the Varying
Perspectives
Publications on Joint Stock Corporations found support from the accounts of each

company through their minute books and journals, as well as historical documents
pertaining to the Crown's economic affairs. These minute books and records have been
used by many economic historians to track the process and development to establish a
foundation for their hypotheses. Theories formed from piecing together entries in the
record books contain valuable information on the emergence and growth of commerce in
Europe. These historians faced many challenges as records have not always been valued,
which led to their poor preservation methods.
In the specific instances of the Muscovy Company, the East India Company and

the Virginia Company, many important operation records were discarded as it was "the
general opinion of the period that such material was valueless" (Kingsbury 15). Later, as
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these companies' the activities developed and the number of members increased, official
records grew in importance. The increasing complexity in operations required official
records to identify each shareholder and their respective contributions. The contribution
record vitally impacted the amount that needed to be paid out to each member. Neglect
may not be intentional in many situations. There were instances where documents were
initially view as unnecessary, which resulted in them being discarded. These initially
unessential documents can be later viewed as important. Since these records were not
preserved, as time passed, their known value is lost. Even when records were valued and
diligently preserved, natural disasters worked against these preservation efforts. Disasters
such as the great fire destroyed "original charters, seal and many other [documents]"
(Cheyney315).
Continued neglect and other unexpected disasters throughout history also
contributed to loss of these company's records. One form of neglect was demonstrated
by the lack of "regard for method or order" of preservation (Danvers and Foster 2). As a
result, "[its] history must therefore be pieced together from such scattered records of
other kinds as still exist" (Cheyney 315). The availability of accurate historical data left
many questions still unanswered.

These attributed to the varying perspectives in

reflecting the true circumstances of the creation of joint stock companies.

1.4.

Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2.1 begins the discussion with an

examination of an earlier ancestor to the Tudor joint stock corporations. This information
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helps to establish precedence for the joint stock corporation structure. The details of this
will offer insights to later trade development and growth of the Tudor period in England.
Section 2.2 details the trade environment in the Tudor period in England. This is
germane to the development of joint stock corporations into the modern business
enterprise.

This information tendered imminent insight on the growing need for

increasing funding requirements. The growth in the capital structure led to advancements
of joint stock associations. Prolific business advancements soon decreased profits in the
domestic market.

This growth inundated the domestic profit potential.

In order to

maintain profitable operations, companies must explore distant markets. In the early
sixteenth century, geographical exploration was not well developed.

This left many

distant territories unknown and unchartered. Since distant territories were unknown, a
trade route had not yet been established. Traveling to areas that were unchartered came
with significant risk.
Section 2.3 explores the potential risk exposure. The recognition of high levels of
risk led to an important business venture. This section goes further to detail the risk
sharing and increased funding requirement as the precursor for the creation of joint stock
companies. The risk stems from many variables, which include, but not limited, to travel
time, weather conditions, and political environment.

Exploring unknown territories

required extensive resources made possible only by large capital funding. Since the risks
were high, very few merchants alone could fund these distant voyages. Distant voyages

funded by multiple investors reduced this risk. Since each contributes a small portion,
the risk borne to them is less than it would be if it were funded by one person. The
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consolidation of assets in this manner makes each contributing member an owner, or
shareholder, of a joint stock venture. The emergence of joint stock trading companies
was created out of the need for increased funding requirements. Continued transactions
in this joint stock form led to increasing growth in trade in England and in other
territories.
Section 2.4 discusses how this growth led to the Crown's involvement. This
paper's position is that growing trade was accompanied by increasing political
competition for power and profit. This led England to increase spending on domestic
security. This trend led to increasing expenditures that were growing faster than Crown's
revenue sources at the time. Growth in trade became a strong interest for the Crown as a
new mechanism for rent extraction to remedy the Crown's increasing expenditures. The
Crown strategically created royal charters with a strict application process to achieve
greater revenues for their own purposes. The Crown was not interested in transacting
with all joint stock companies but only with highly profitable companies in which higher
levels of revenues can be extracted. The Crown aimed to only to grant charters for
companies that have proven to be a success. Highly successful companies, to the Crown,
were those that had significant capital structures. To attract companies to apply for a
royal charter, the Crown established certain trade restrictions then created a royal charter
to waive these restrictions. The creation of these two policies forced successful joint
stock companies to apply for a royal charter to continue earning a profit. The charter

allowed companies to continue with their operations if profits were shared with the
crown.
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Although trade growth provided many benefits, one problem rose from the
increasing activities. The risks were spread across all the shareholders. However, there
was no limit on the extent of the risk of each contributor. Investors recognize that with
increasing activities, increasing liability also exists. Section II. 5 develop on the rise of
liability and detail the emergence of limited liability. Limited liability was a useful tool
that allowed joint stock associations to continue to thrive.
Section 3 combines the different elements that portray the spontaneous emergence
of joint stock companies by exploring three case studies. This section examines the
circumstances that led to the creation of three large joint stock companies of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries. The formation of The Muscovy Company, the East India
Company and the Virginia Company lends support for the spontaneous creation of joint
stock corporations. These companies' independent operations demonstrate the Crown's
peripheral role in the initial organization of joint stock companies.
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2.
THE GROWTH OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES IN ENGLAND IN THE
1600s

2.1.

Precursor to Trade in England: Trade in the Middle Ages
The main focus of this thesis is on the joint stock corporations in the Tudor Period

in England. Although other forms of joint stock corporations will not be discussed at
length, there is one that deserves notable mention. Discussions regarding joint stock
corporations are not complete without mention of the role of the Commenda Contract.
The Commenda Contract "embodied borrowings from several sources in different
portions," a trait that is more commonly known as a joint stock association (Pryor 5).
The Commenda Contract came about to achieve adequate capital requirements for trade.
John Maitland and Otto Von Gierke are strong literary figures in connection with the
history of joint stock corporations in the Commenda Contract form.
Maitland and Gierke theorized that "individual men are the 'real' and 'natural'
persons [where] State and Man [are on] one level" (Gierke and Maitland xi). Simply put,
Maitland and Gierke expressed that men are capable of governing their own affairs. The
extent to which individual men and their business associations can self regulate are
entirely independent of state intervention. The notion of self regulation borrowed from
Maitland and Gierke in later publications attesting to the self-governing nature of private
merchant companies.
Although the modern corporation is most related to the joint stock companies of
the Tudor period in England, the earliest remnants of a joint stock company emerged well
before this time. The earliest documented forms of joint stock associations came about
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during the Middle Ages. The joint stock associations of the Tudor period were modeled
after those of the Middle Ages. Because of this important connection to the earliest
known form of joint stock associations, its history cannot go unmentioned. The
Commenda Contracts were a precursor to the joint stock business association. These
contracts were "an arrangement whereby an investor or group of investors entrusts capital
or merchandise to an agent-manager, who is to trade with it, and then return to the
investor(s) the principal and previously agreed upon share of profits" (Udovitch 198).

2.2.

Trade in England
In order to analyze the creation of joint stock companies it is necessary to explore

the trade environment in England at a time when trade began to flourish. Growth in trade
in England was the precursor for many important business developments. These include
the development of joint stock corporations, royal charters, and the notion of limited
liability.
Prior to the fifteenth century, trade in England was "almost entirely in the hands
of foreigners" (Cheyney 161). Merchant vessels carried goods from foreign lands to
England and exported goods native to England to foreign countries.

At this time,

inflation was a major economic problem that affected all of Europe. Although the
inflation rate was relatively low, at "2 or 3 percent a year, it was noticeable in a Europe
accustomed to stable prices" (Spielvogel 401). This economic problem was known as the
Price Revolution. The Price Revolution caused hardships for the average laborer in
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Europe, particularly those in the agricultural industries, since the price of these primary
resources were volatile.
However, the Price Revolution did not affect everyone equally. Aristocrats who
owned land were able to take advantage of this unstable price structure to increase rent.
The profits realized from the rent hike made investments in other more profitable
ventures possible. Profits secured by aristocrats were a valuable "stimulus to investment
and the growth of capitalism" (Spielvogel 401). A popular investment venture was in
overseas trade. This provided abundant resources for merchants embarking on overseas
trade expeditions.
As trade flourished in England, private trade merchant companies became more
commonplace. This expansion was made possible by the "extensive trade [that took
place] among native merchants" (Lingelbach xxiii). Their reputation grew through "the
number and size of their ships and the extent of their trade" (Cheyney 162).
Trade among English merchants continued to flourish from the mid fifteenth
century to the early sixteenth centuries. The fifteenth century marked the beginning of
the expansion of commerce. An account of all major companies totaled 169 at that time
(Cheyney 162). An increasing trend in domestic and foreign trade continued over the
next fifty years. The tally of all major companies came to 3000 during this period of
growth (Cheyney 162).
In this context, companies were defined as organizations that engaged in trade

transactions for financial gain. Many of the trade companies that existed were created by
a single influential merchant. In other instances, companies were formed from a legal
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partnership of multiple merchants' who consolidated their assets. A major company can
be defined by the characteristics of influential leadership and substantial investment
capital. Moreover, these tend to be companies that are large enough to be "entrusted with
responsibilities" that came with the royal charter (Mockler-Ferryman 258).

This

designation was somewhat arbitrary since there was no strict metric that defines what was
influential and substantial.
At the turn of the fifteenth century, increasing trade activities among English
merchants led to the exploration of foreign goods made possible by overseas trading
ventures.

The growth of these activities further sealed joint stock companies and

England's role in international trade. Within a century, there were a total of 3500 major
merchant companies trading to the Netherlands alone (Cheyney 162).

During this

expansion, there was still considerable trade under the management of foreigners.
Funding requirements became a primary concern for many merchants when trade
began to flourish. In England, trade dominance shifted to domestic merchants, which
only boosted English merchants' role on the domestic level. The international trade
market was very much under the control of nations who have developed trade long before
England. Demand did not grow as rapidly as the supply available for trade locally, which
quickly led to unprofitable domestic trade in England. This was partly due to the Price
Revolution. Since domestic trade was no longer profitable, merchants entertained the
idea of trade abroad to remain profitable. The potential for trade abroad brought many

possibilities. Traveling abroad entailed developing the export and import markets for
England.
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The prospect of wealth was plentiful, but funding for these voyages was not. In
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, merchants were restricted to lending activities
within inner circles of social business acquaintances and family (Klein, Ragg and Rabb
47). Restricted lending activities occurred because only close acquaintances were more
familiar with the willingness to lend and the ability to repay. As trade transactions
became prolific and expanded to the international realm, this form of lending in the inner
circles was inadequate to meet with the demand for credit. The rise of specialists gilds
such as "goldsmiths" and "scriveners" remedied the inadequacies. These gilds were a
lending institution that provided funding to merchants seeking to raise capital
requirements.

2.3.

Joint Stock Companies
The association of merchants paved the way for a valuable business development,

joint stock companies.

Early joint stock companies were organized through the

association of few merchants. This was primarily due to their small-scaled operations. In
this early stage, trade was not extensive. In the mid 1400s, trade activities were limited
to nearby regions, as many trade routes had remained unexplored.

With limited

activities, smaller financial investments were necessary to fund these ventures, therefore,
less financial support required led to fewer investors needed.

2.3.a. Capital Requirement

17

In the late 1400s and early 1500s, gains from trade were almost completely
realized in trade with local regions. Motivations for increased profits lead to the desire
for exploration in distant countries.

Voyages to distant lands required substantially

greater financial support, which was achieved through the capital investments from many
contributors. Companies such as the Muscovy Company, the Virginia Company, the East
India Company and the Hudson Bay Company formed to explore trade routes to distant
provinces. The primary reason for chartering trade routes to distant regions was to search
for resources for trade. Trade was chiefly a local venture prior to this period, which left
many distant nations unexplored.

Since several regions were un-chartered, merchant

companies wishing to map out a trade route must plan for long voyages. Expeditions can
take one to three or more years depending on the route and weather conditions. Long
expeditions required extensive supplies, and hence, substantial funds.
Funding was made possible through passive investments from multiple
contributors.

Joint stock companies were formed from the pooling of these passive

investments. Significant risks with overseas trade posed a problem for the emerging
companies. However, by having multiple investors, the risks were shared among all
shareholders, which reduced the risk to the individual contributor.

Each member's

contribution purchased some share of the company's stock. Holding stock in a company
entitled the investor to profits that were proportionate to their contribution. In this type of
a business agreement, not only was the risk spread across multiple bearers, but the gain to

the lender was proportionately greater.
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The structure of a joint stock company established that each member was an
independent trader bounded by the rules of the company's charter.

Each member

invested money in the form of partnerships that would allow other members to "trade
with it on condition of receiving a certain portion of the profits of the venture or sharing
in its loss" (Meredith 88). Each member who contributed funds towards the joint venture
was known as an investor or shareholder.

Investors "provided capital for these

corporations" (Frankfurter, Wood and Wansley 12).

There were two types of

investments, passive and active (Klein, Ragg and Rabb 48). Active investments entailed
not only a monetary contribution from each investor, but also an investment in their time
and expertise on commerce. Alternately, passive investments depicted only a financial
contribution from each investor.

The investor did not actively participate in the

operations of the company. Historically, joint stock corporations were formed from
multiple passive contributions.
To conduct business, an agreement was drafted by the members of the joint stock
companies.

This agreement came was to be known as the company charter.

This

company charter differed from the royal charter that was granted by the Crown. The
royal charter issued by the state is one which formally recognizes and extends protection
to the private company in their trade ventures. This distinction is significant since the
term "charter" varied in different contexts.

Although the charter offers protection and

formally recognizes a company's incorporation, most companies did not have a royal

charter.
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2.3.b. Corporate Structure and the Benefits that It Confers
Individual joint stock companies conducted business using the funds contributed
by its many financiers (Gawson). Each shareholder had a passive involvement in the
company's principal operations. Since its inception, joint stock companies have always
been "managed by a court of directors" (Smith 330). The board of directors comprised of
a "select body drawn from the members" (Macmillan 8). "Court of directors" and "board
of directors" can be used interchangeably.
These companies "traded as separate legal persons with assets or stock
contributed by their members" (Brazier 7).

Trades were conducted on behalf of their

many stock holders. Profits were realized from "each member's [contributions] to the
merchandise to be sold at the end of the particular trading venture" (Brazier 7). As the
merchandise was sold off, "each would share proportionately in any profits resulting at
that time" (Brazier 7). When an investor passed away, "their shares could be sold to a
new member," and the profits were transferred accordingly (Macmillan 8). Alternately,
if the merchandise was not sold, or was sold for a loss, each member also suffered a loss
proportionate to his contribution. Investing in multiple ventures is a hedge against the
potential for loss. Should a shareholder suffer a loss, wealth prospects in future ventures
can offset this.
Aside from the reduced risk, having multiple investors offered another benefit.
When funding was established in this manner, "they were capable of existing in
perpetuity and did not automatically wind-up on the death of a member" (Brazier 7). In
the event of a death or loss of a member, the overall fund can still be maintained by the
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remaining members. Furthermore, since each member contributed a small sum, the lost
contribution can be recovered with less effort. When the numbers of shareholders are in
the hundreds and thousands, existing members can increase their contribution by a
minimal amount to meet the required funding. Alternately, lost funds can be recovered
by finding a single contributor to invest the amount equal to the loss or finding multiple
investors whose contributions sum to the total amount lost. Since the probability of
losing all of their members was very low, there was a good possibility that the company
could maintain its existence.
During the late seventeenth century, the Spaniards had significant influence in
trade over England.

Spanish expeditions led to the conquest of many territories in

Western Europe. Their conquest provided Spain with strong political and trade influence.
This period of exploration and commercial expansion for Spain became known as the
Spanish Armada period. Martin and Parker went as far as claiming that the entire "world
never saw such a force as theirs was" in referencing the powers possessed by the Spain
(Martin and Parker 1). However, when the Armada entered the English Channel, the
English were prepared.

The Armada was defeated, thus ending Spanish trade and

political prowess. This victory empowered English merchants with confidence in their
own abilities and influences.
After the Armada fight, "new companies [emerged to take] the place of the old
gilds, and though these were formed on the models of the earlier gild organizations, there

was this difference, that the gilds had been authorized by the Crown in which they
operated, whereas the companies were created by and were under the regulation of the
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Crown" (Herrick 214). Echoing the sentiment of his colleagues, Herrick posited that the
chief reason for the Crown's involvement in the charter's creation was "to get revenue"
(Herrick 214). The crown's involvement created two types of companies at this time,
Join stock and regulated.
As the name suggests, joint stock was a company that comprised of many
individuals contributing to a common stock in the business venture.

Joint stock

companies were established in two ways, "either by royal charter or by acts of
parliament" (Smith 329). Often there were hundreds, if not thousands, of investors. High
numbers of shareholders typically accompanied larger-scaled ventures since grandeur
expeditions required extensive funding.
Furthermore, the many investors not only allowed for funds to be easily raised for
single voyages, but also provided for continued capital over a period of time. When the
notion was first introduced, joint stock ventures commonly raise funds for a single
voyage.

As business continued and increased profits were achieved, investors saw

greater opportunities for profit to be involved in long term business endeavor to fund
multiple voyages. This concept soon became popular.
The English East India Company was an example of a joint stock company that
transpired into an enduring business venture. The English East India Company and the
Dutch East India Company, among several others at the time started out by raising capital
for a single voyage. The Dutch East India, established in Holland in 1602 was "the first

permanently organized Joint Stock Company" (Frankfurter, Wood and Wansley 12).
This notion soon became commonplace, and in 1614, separate fund raising ventures for
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each voyage was replaced by "joint stock ventures of several year's duration" (Lack and
Kley 75).
Alternately, "regulated companies were those under the direct control of the
government, with their trades defined, and open to any merchant who conformed to the
regulations" (Herrick 215). Adam Smith described a regulated company as a company
that does not "trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged to admit any person, properly
qualified, upon paying a certain fine, and agreeing to submit to the regulations of the
company, and each member trading upon his own stock, and at his own risk" (Smith
322).
Many joint stock trading companies possessed state issued charters, suggesting
that it was a requirement for their organization. However, join stock companies "differed
from corporations in that it lacked a royal charter" (Rosenberg and Birdzell 195). Joint
stock companies that acquired a charter became a joint stock corporation. The operations
of a joint stock company were the same, whether it was a corporation or a partnership.
The only difference was that they were "authorized by law to act under a corporate name
and to issue stock to its members" in return for their financial contribution (Conyngton
21). "Partnership" is a loose term used to define the merging of two or more merchants
companies for the purpose of advancing profits. The context of this is important to note
since partnerships in the legal sense represents a "common law commercial association"
(Rosenberg and Birdzell 195). Taken out of context, the partnerships which formed at
this time could be misconstrued to mean a formal and legal association of merchants
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recognized by law.

In the late sixteenth century, English common law divided

commercial associations into partnerships and corporations.
The difference between partnerships and corporations was that partnerships do not
require the support of a royal charter. Joint stock companies who formed without a royal
charter had three qualities. First, this partnership entailed offering each investor's full
assets in support of the joint business endeavor. As a result, "their members were liable
without limit for the debt of the company" (Rosenberg and Birdzell 195). A member in
this framework was synonymous with investors or shareholders. This liability was only
problematic when the venture suffered a loss.
Second, a joint stock company that formed without a royal charter did not have
the support from governing bodies to "enforce rights in property and contracts"
(Rosenberg and Birdzell 196). This left each company to their own method of regulating
and enforcing contract terms. Repeated interaction and other means of regulation were
crucial to the success of companies formed without a royal charter. Firms can only profit
from interacting with other firms for various trade endeavors. This created an incentive
base for firms to continue to comply with contract terms, since non-compliance would
tarnish their reputation. Once a company acquired a bad reputation, it would be difficult
for them to find transactional partners in the future. Since trade involves transactions
with other merchants, the inability to find a trading partner would result in a loss in
profits.
The last trait of a company organized without a royal charter was that they were
believed to be agents acting against the state. This conspiracy was instilled by the state
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as a method of motivating companies to apply for a charter. The Crown and parliament
were interested "in the revenues to be derived by the granting corporate charters"
(Rosenberg and Birdzell 196). This idea was adopted from the Romans, who believed
that all private associations were potential conspiracies against the state. The Crown
declared that no private association "was recognized as lawful unless it was duly licensed
by imperial authorities" (Rosenberg and Birdzell 196). To shield their true incentives,
the Crown announced that this rule was established to prevent high treason against the
state.
This policy created obstacles for merchants wishing to organize together for
mutual benefit through the advancement of trade. However, the incentives and self
regulation methods were still effective, despite the lack of legal protection. Three such
companies include the "Fishmonger adventurers", the "master, wardens, and commodity
of Merchant Venturers, of Bristol" and the "society of Merchant Adventurers of
Newcastle upon Tyne". These merchants were one of the first associations to organize
themselves into a joint trading company for "mutual protection or other advantages"
(Cheyney 164).
Default was at its peak in England in the fifteenth century, which increased the
level of risk experienced by each shareholder. The high risk corresponded to a low
likelihood of finding investors for a distant trade venture.

Joint stock companies

combated this by offering reduced risks to each shareholder.

This paramount time of economic development also came at a time of
parliamentary re-organization, led by Henry VII in the mid fifteenth century. Henry VII
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"put an end to the disorders of the nobility [by making] parliament relatively insignificant
[and] increasing [regulation of] the income of the Crown" (Cheyney 138).

The

reformation under the guidance of Henry VII did not come at a low cost. This reorganization in addition to financing war and military efforts resulted in exorbitant
expenditures.

Increasing military expenditures were prompted by Spain's increasing

political and economic dominance.

England saw a correlation between Spain's

developed trade routes and political supremacy.
The Crown saw this parliamentary re-organization as an opportunity to exploit the
growing trade market. In an effort to enhance its political dominance, the Crown devised
a strategy to share in the profits from trade. The Crown's strategizing led to the creation
of a royal charter. The charter was a tax-like arrangement since it required companies to
share a portion of its profits with the Crown. The application of a royal charter tends "to
over-[tax], and therefore checks rather than encourage trade" (Mockler-Ferryman 260).
The creation of royal charters was an "unpopular and illegal means of extortion from the
people" undertaken by Henry VII to raise funds for the Crown (Cheyney 138).

2.4.

Royal charters
Joint stock corporations provided abundant benefits, which allowed each

company to foster profitable growth. This growth gained increasing interest from other
merchants and more importantly, it captured the Crown's attention. As trade flourished,
so did the struggles for political dominance.

The Crown's political agenda led to

increasing expenditures that grew at a pace more rapid than the national income.
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2.4.a. Purpose of a Royal Charter
By the sixteenth century, the government introduced the notion of a royal charter.
A new method of rent extraction developed in the form of a royal trade charter. The
Crown created this charter to impose restrictions where none existed. In doing so, the
State created a barrier for merchants to earn a profit. The royal charter, synonymous with
a state charter, then afforded companies possessing this accord to circumvent newly
imposed restrictions. The creation of a royal charter did not come without a cost. It is
not uncommon for "political extortion via 'rent extraction' [to result in] the detriment of
society generally" (McChesney x). The Crown was chiefly interested in profit-sharing.
The imposition of trade restriction to companies not in possession of a royal charter
forced already successful companies to apply for one.
By accepting the privileges of the royal charter, English merchants agree to allow
the Crown to share in the profits realized from each expedition. The Crown shared a
percentage of the total revenues generated by each venture. The net revenues were
subject to several taxes in the form of payments to other merchants companies and
royalties to foreign nations for certain trade rights. Royal charters evolved from the
"royal grants for discovery in the sixteenth century" (Kingsbury 11). The initial issuance
of royal charters was for reasons of land discovery, a right and privilege that were "meant
to extend to all Englishmen beyond the seas" (Lingelbach xxii). It was not until 1505
that the "privileges for the first time [were] limited to a special group of merchants"
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(Lingelbach xxii). The privileges mentioned in this context are typical of a "political
extortion [system], or 'rent extraction'" (McChesney 2).
Royal charters were a license that granted each company the authority to transact
within the country of the charter's origin. In many cases, the charter granted monopoly
privileges for domestic trade as well as trade outside of England. "The charter granted
[them] an elaborate body of rights, privileges, rules and regulations as was already
possessed by each of these old organizations, and was to become typical of a whole group
of sixteenth and seventeenth century commercial companies" (Cheyney 314).
Royal charters, served to enhance the rights and privileges of merchant adventures
in regions under the Crown's jurisdiction, rather than act as the enabling factor for their
progression in general.

The monopoly was not quite as simple as the concept may

suggest. Smith, remarked that "the monopoly is more or less strict according as the terms
of admission are more or less difficult; and according as the directors of the company
have more or less authority, or have it more or less in their power to manage in such a
manner as to confine the greater part of the trade to themselves and their particular
friends" (Smith 322).

Since monopolies were granted to few trade companies,

transactions were also limited. The restricted transactions placed a limit the growth
potential.

Monopoly privileges did not necessarily entail success.

Companies with

monopoly privileges can be ineffective traders if there were no commonly desired goods.
Having a monopoly granted by the Crown in this regards was rather ineffective since the

profits were restricted to the magnitude of transactions as well as those merchants who
were given this privilege.
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A trade monopoly is almost synonymously associated with a royal charter.
However, and ironically, a trade "monopoly is actually forbidden by the charter"
(Mockler-Ferryman 260). Monopoly privileges came about not directly from the statutes
outlined by the charters, but from human nature's inherent need to "use the administrative
power so as to benefit the Company in the matter of trade, to the detriment of all others"
((Mockler-Ferryman 260).
The royal charters formally allowed trade companies to be legally recognized by
the Crown. This entitled them to legal protection against firms reneging on contract
terms. Many companies use this authority to their advantage to create a monopoly,
though forbidden by the charters. Monopolies were not difficult to manifest since the
royal charters provided governing rights to members of the board of governors. These
rights afforded them with the authority to act on behalf of parliament to monitor and
enforce laws and resolve any conflicts that may arise.
Each merchant company was able to levy fines to those who trespassed or
infringed upon their trade monopolies.

High fines can be prohibitive to a smaller

merchant company's growth. The support of the Crown provided additional authority in
regions explored and governed by England. However, in other nation's territories, the
privileges afforded by the royal charter were less effective. In regions where the Crown's
charters have less authority, dividends from trade provided for sufficient payments to
obtain certain trade privileges.

Before a company could be incorporated and apply for a charter, it had to
establish an economic foundation. The creators and promoters had to convince that the
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company had the potential to operate successfully. This was particularly important when
additional funds were still needed for the company to begin its operations. The founders
must detail the "nature of the company, the capital requirement as well as the return that
each investor may expect for their contribution" (Clark 69).
This formal structure advocated that joint stock companies can operate
functionally and profitably independent of the rights promised by the royal charter.
Moreover, the foundation created significant benefits from the companies' operations as a
private joint stock entity. A profitable operation or one that elicits potential for success
entails flourishing trade transactions on a domestic or international level. Since the
development of a successful trade venture was a prerequisite for acquiring a royal charter,
the protection made possible by the charters served to enhance trade performance rather
than act as an enabling force that allowed trade to occur.

2.4.b. The Crown's Motivations
The Crown's primary incentive to intervene in merchant activities was to obtain
revenues, which made their relationship more of a partnership. The partnership detailed
their "legal arrangement whereby two or more persons agree to carry on a business for
profit" (Truitt 253).
The fact that the Crown was involved in trade can be further established by
examining England's financial state. In the early sixteenth century, Spain had political
and trade dominance, which depressed England's growth. Between the period of 1560
and 1580, "the real income of the Crown fell by almost 15 percent" (Goldstone 98). The
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decreased revenues were driven by large expenditures for "military engagements in
Ireland and war with Spain" (Goldstone 98). England's usual method for extracting
revenues through "taxing incomes of the landed gentry" proved inadequate, which led to
the exploration of other revenue extraction methods. The establishment of the royal
charters, or trade charters, was more than a coincidence in light of the Crown's increasing
conflict expenditures.

The financial crisis caused by decreasing real income was

remedied by the profit-sharing agreement inherent in the granting of the royal charters.
The privileges bestowed on the few merchant adventurers limited the growth in
the international realm. Royal charters restricted trade in England to selected English
merchants. Therefore, foreign merchants were restricted from trading in English ports.
Danvers and Fosters suggested that "it [was] possible that trade would have centered in
England rather than in Holland but for the restrictive nature of English laws with regard
to shipping and trade by foreigners" (Danvers and Foster xx). Although England gained
a dominant position in domestic trade by driving out foreign companies, trade in the
international realm was still predominately the arena of foreign merchants.
The primary concern associated with policies that restricted foreign merchants'
trade transactions in England was that it offended many foreign dignitaries. While this
monopoly eliminated some foreign competition, it came at the cost of amiable foreign
relationships. When Henry VII prohibited the import and export of goods from foreign
merchants, this "gave offense to foreign princes, who, thinking that the law was made to

the prejudice of their respective countries and natives, made similar laws with regard to
the shipping of their own dominions" (Danvers and Fosters xxi). The advances on the
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domestic level eventually became detrimental in the long range because of the limitations
that were created by foreign countries in retaliation. The Crown's policies made possible
by the establishment of royal charters, remained lacking in forethought.
Aside from the reduced trade benefits from similar monopoly policies enforced by
foreign nations to benefit native merchants, the significant time delay for charter grants
also hurt merchant companies in their formative stage. In the case of Royal African
Company, a year passed before a Royal charter was issued, and only then could the
corporation observe its rights and privileges (Klein, Ragg and Rabb 98).
Another company that endured a similar length wait time as the Royal African
Company was the Royal Niger Company. The Royal Niger Company, formed in 1885,
"made great strides in developing trade" without the assistance of a royal charter
(Mockler-Ferryman 258). They accomplished this by acquiring extensive rights from the
native chiefs. Ironically, the Royal Niger Company was denied a royal charter in its
initial application "on the grounds that the Company was too small to be entrusted with
such responsibilities" (Mockler-Ferryman 258). However, the denied application did not
prevent the company from developing trade in Africa. It was not until the Royal Niger
Company has raised £1,000,000 that the Crown finally acknowledged there was adequate
capital to take on the responsibilities that accompanied the royal charter (MocklerFerryman 259). Without initial support from the royal chart, the Royal Niger Company's
booming trade development demonstrated that the Crown did not vehemently monitor

trade outside of England. Other companies wishing to develop trade in Africa could do
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so by acquiring trade rights from native chiefs. Finding ways to circumvent the royal
charter proved to be more direct and impactful.

2.5.

Limited Liability
The legal doctrines of the corporation prior to the limited liability rule almost

exclusively relied on the members' self purported claims of being a "moral or legal
person [or] (collective entity)" (Gordon and Fergus 166).

Reliance on personal

testimonies of "moral" exposes business partners to some level of risk. The risk is
heightened by the organizational structure of the company.
The organizational structure of joint stock companies in the seventeenth century
consists of a core group of decision makers acting on behalf of all of its members. Since
the managers of these companies were "managers rather of other people's money than of
their own, it cannot be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious
vigilance" (Smith 330).

The board of director's independent role may result in a

tremendous potential for loss. This was particularly problematic when the board of
directors was comprised of highly influential merchants or statesmen. These prominent
and highly wealthy individuals may have contributed a small share proportionate to their
total asset. If it were the case that a temporary loss could lead to significant gains, the
board members may choose to take a loss for a greater promise of future gains. Though
the loss suffered by the board was insignificant compared to their total wealth, the loss
was disabling, to other shareholders.

33

Should the board of governors make a poor business decision, the lack of an
established liability rule exposed every member to significant risk. When there were no
limits on liability, all contributing members of a corporation were considered part of the
corporation, thus, debt holders could go after not only the corporation, but all of its
investors' private assets. This dilemma further increased the risks borne to each investor.
The dilemma from this liability issue lends itself to the emergence of limited liability
partnerships and company.
Limited liability is a fairly new principle that was first introduced in 1856 (W and
R Chambers 734). The limited liability rule was "not [a common] feature of eighteenthcentury company law" (Gordon and Fergus 166). Joint stock companies operated for
many years before the creation of limited liability laws. Operations thrived through
individual aspirations for mutually beneficial gains. Mutually beneficial gain was the
primary incentive for individuals to remain truthful in their contractual obligations. As
commercial activities became more elaborate, potential for profit and loss also increased.
Since there is more at stake with elaborate commercial activities, self-reported claims of
virtue became less reliable. Companies needed a concrete business structure to reduce
the increased risk exposure.
The limited liability partnership is "a form of partnership that allows a group of
professionals to work together enjoying the tax advantages of a partnership while limiting
their liability" (Truitt 250).

A limited liability company differs slightly from a

partnership in that it is "a hybrid form of business organization offering limited liability
protection of a corporation and the tax advantage of a partnership" (Truitt 250). The
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primary difference between the two is based on their legal organization. An LLP is one
in which the members, or investor, represents themselves in a venture while an LLC is
one in which the members form a separate entity and each represents that entity in their
business transactions. Under both forms, the shareholders' are protected from being fully
liable for the losses.
The limited liability rule evolved into the Companies Act of 1862, whereby
additional requirements were instituted (W and R Chambers 734). This act instructed
that "any seven or more persons associated for any lawful purpose may subscribe a
memorandum of association" to register as a company. For associations consisting of
twenty or more persons, it becomes mandatory for them to first register as a company
under the Companies Act of 1862.
Restricting the shareholder's exposure to risk was an important quality that
brought about the limited liability corporation.

The term "corporation" will be used

synonymously with "company" and the "association of merchants". The purpose of
providing limited liability for a corporation was to protect against exposing any one
contributor to significant risk (Harvard Law Review 537).

In a limited liability

corporation, "if a company contracted debts, no matter how large, every member was
liable, if his co-members proved unable to pay their proportions, to pay the whole of
these debts, even in the last schilling of his fortune - a result which proved ruinous to the
richer members" (W and R Chambers 734).

The extent of the liability to each investor varied greatly. With limited liability,
the incorporated company acted as its own legal entity (Brazier 7). This form of a

35

corporation allowed the "risk of each investment to the amount invested, and no more"
(Lajoux xiii). Therefore, the risk extended only as far as the assets that were invested. In
this way, assets not connected to a joint stock company were protected. For contributors
with significant assets the limited liability partnership proved to be beneficial.
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3. CASE STUDIES FROM ENGLISH CORPORATIONS IN THE 1600s AND
1700s

3.1.

The Muscovy Company
The first known joint stock company "organized in Great Britain was the Eastland

Trading Company" (Frankfurter, Wood and Wansley 12). The original charter was
issued in the fifteenth century which provided the Eastland Company with monopoly
rights to trade in the Baltic regions. This type of business endeavor was followed in the
sixteenth century by the Muscovy Company and the Levant Company, who chartered a
trade with Russia and Turkey.
In 1553, a group of merchants in London organized their resources to form one of
the first joint stock trading companies. The Muscovy Company has been associated by
several names, some of which included the Russian Company, Russia Trading Company,
and Russian Merchant Adventures. Their aspiration was not only to travel to the "rich
trading grounds of China and the East Indies, but also [to find] new and unknown
kingdoms on the way thither" (Cheyney 312). In the beginning of their association,
individuals of this group called themselves the "Mysterie and Companie of the Merchants
Adventurers for the Discoverie of Regions, Dominion, Islands and places unknowen"
(Hakloyet 3). The formation of the Muscovy Company was primarily motivated by their
account of the "wealth of the Spaniards and Portingales, by the discoverie and search of
newe trades and countreys marueilously increased, supposing the same to be a course and
meane for them to also obteine the like" (Read 23). The Spanish's and Portuguese's
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increasing wealth from overseas trade ventures demonstrated the abundance and
availability of the prosperity that awaited their discovery.
The initial "capital of the [Muscovy] Company £6,000 [was] provided by 240
share-holders" (Kotilaine 94).

The average individual contrition was £25.

Though

seemingly insignificant, a comparison of the cost of living in England in the sixteenth
century against the average day-laborer's wage and the price of other goods, show that
£25 is not a small sum.
Aside from trade, agricultural production was a vital and prominent economic
base during this period. Table 1 contains information on the typical agricultural wages
during this period compared to the price of foodstuffs and industrial products to illustrate
the relative value of the typical contribution from each investor. It was unusual for the
average laborer to earn a wage that was greater than 100 pence a day (Meredith 86). One
hundred pence (penny) is the equivalent to one pound sterling. A comparison of this
against the price of food-stuff showed the declining purchasing power of the average
citizen. Wage earners, particularly day laborers, "saw their standard of living drop"
(Spielvogel 401). Wages did rise slightly "during these inflationary periods, but they
lagged behind prices" (Overton 68). Given the relative price of foodstuffs, the daily
wage of a day laborer was mainly spent on sustenance. The contribution of £25 relative
to the cost of living was a significant amount of money. Due to the low wages for the
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average day laborer, investors of joint stock companies were typically comprised of
English gentlemen, such as Sir Dudley Digges2 and Henry Hudson.

3

Table 1. Average Price and Wage in the Sixteenth Century
Prices and Wages 1491-15904
Price of
foodstuffs
(1451-75=100)
1491-1500
100
1501-1510
106
1511-1520
116
1521-1530
159
1531-1540
161
217
1541-1550
315
1551-1560
298
1561-1570
341
1571-1580
1581-1590
389

Price of
industrial
products
97
98
102
110
110
127
186
218
223
230

Agricultural
Wages
(1450-99=100)
101
101
101
106
110
118
160
177
207
203

Source: Extracted from the Phelps Brown & Hopkin price index,
quoted in D. M. Palliser, The Age of Elizabeth: England under the
later Tudors, 1547-1603, 1983

Sir Dudley Digges and Henry Hudson, among other aristocrats and wealthy landowning merchants were able to prosper at the expense of the average populace by
increasing rent.

These wealthy individuals charged higher rent to circumvent the

inflation with investments in high yield ventures. High yield returns were achieved vis-avis investments in a joint stock company's overseas expeditions. The ability of the rich
2

Read (1866: 14) - Sir Dudley Digges was a prominent member of the state and mathematician who was
later knighted and became a prominent statesman. (Virginia Historical Society, 1888)
3
Read (1866: 32) - Henry Hudson was one of the first founders of The Muscovy Company, was a man of
great wealth and extended influence. He was part of twelve different prominent associations in London at
the time. Later Henry Hudson became involved in the notable Hudson's Bay Company in the Americas.
4
Prices are in pence and wages are in terms of pence earned per day (Overton [1996, p. 68]).
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to hedge against rising prices established a perpetual cycle where wealth begets more
wealth at the expense of the poor.
On May 10 , 1553, the Muscovy Company set forth on its first expedition. At
this time, the "association [was not yet] formally recognized by the Crown" (Read 24).
These merchants set sail without a royal charter. The first three merchant ships were
equipped for an eighteen-month voyage with goods thought to be suitable for sale in
China and other lands. Two of the three ships' route took them northward to Norway,
against the wind and around the North Cape. It was here that they encountered severe
weather conditions. The company and crew of these two vessels were unable to endure
the long northern winter, and as a result, they "died of hunger, cold and scurvy"
(Cheyney 313). The third ship, under the guidance of Richard Chancellor, successfully
traveled further eastward to the White Sea. The success of which "laid the foundation of
the Company's prosperity, and of the commercial and political relations which, with but
slight interruptions, have continued to exist between Russia and England to the present
day" (Read 27).
The company's successful venture to the Russian territories demonstrated to the
Czar that the company had significant resources for trade. The company's availability of
resources provided by its many investors also served to portray their potential for success.
When the Muscovy Company reached Russia, the Czar offered them many generous
privileges. The Czar granted the Muscovy Company a charter, which granted "duty-free

trade throughout Russia and free export and importation of good" (Kotilaine 94). The
Czar's generosity was motivated by the desire for a future alliance with England in their
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trade endeavors. The policies offered by the Czar can be described as one of great
diplomacy.
When the Muscovy Company returned to England in 1555 the association
"obtained from Queen Mary, a charter bearing date the 6th of February of 1555" (Read
27). The royal charter granted to the Muscovy Company was an agreement to share, with
the crown, profits earned as a result of the charter. This relationship was better described
as a partnership than one of creator and subject. In this regard, the Crown was another
shareholder in the joint stock company. The custom imposed by the Crown in granting
the Muscovy Company a trade charter was in the amount of £29,315 (Dietz 208).
Customs continued to rise even more substantially in Queen Elizabeth's reign. Queen
Elizabeth raised the customs to £82,797, which was "divided as follows, — old customs,
£25,797; for the state of wares newly appointed £20,000; custom of the Staple, £4,000;
new increase upon cloth, £26,000; new increase upon wines, £4,000; the custom of beer,
£3,000" (Dietz 208).
The Company of Merchant Adventure's successful venture to foreign lands from
multiple investors' joint contributions confirmed that the Royal Charter was not a
requirement for a joint stock corporation's successful operations. This indicated that the
Crown's role may be peripheral to the emergence of joint stock companies. Furthermore,
the Crown's involvement may have been motivated by personal gain. The successful
operations provided a tempting incentive for influential individuals, such as those in

parliament, to impose their will to secure a share of the profits. This was most evident in
Queen Elizabeth's imposition of duties for the revenues earned in the Muscovy
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Company. Queen Elizabeth ensured that the revenues were secured by the Crown, but
the introduction of duties should be attributed to Queen Mary, Elizabeth's predecessor.
The revenue realized by the Crown via customs on sales of merchandise in the Muscovy
Company was "the second great contribution of Mary to a rehabilitation of the finances
of the Kingdom" (Dietz 209). Given the Crown's dire financial condition during the mid
fifteenth hundred, the revenues procured by the Muscovy Company was a significant
contribution not only to commerce but to the Crown's financial rehabilitation.
The royal charter granted the Muscovy Company many privileges, assisting in
their growth in England while simultaneously hindering their growth on the international
arena.

In several instances, the Crown became an active member of the board of

governors.
interest.

The crown's interference in the board of governors was guided by self
The lack of foresight in developing domestic trade at the expense of

international trade may have benefited the member of the board at the cost of diplomatic
relations with foreign nations. The events that transpired from the Czar's attempt to form
an alliance for future trade with England were evident of the Crown's poor policy
strategies. In their return to England, the Muscovy Company reported on the Czar's
wishes to form an alliance with England. The message of Crown's non-cooperative
attitude reached Russia.

The Czar "revoked the Muscovy Company's rights and

confiscated their wares" stored in Russian Territory (Kotilaine 95). The law was quickly
repealed because of the growing distaste of this provision. Even with the repeal, laws at

the time were still "clogged with many restrictions" (Danvers and Fosters xxi).
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The Virginia Company, The Hudson Bay Company and East India Company were
all created for the same purposes as the Muscovy Company, to obtain revenue from trade.
These companies, however, did not all form in the same fashion as the Muscovy
Company.

Failed attempts in operating as a purely regulated companies lead these

merchants to explore and take on the structure of a joint stock company. The joint stock
nature of these prominent companies was the basis for their mention in this paper. The
Muscovy Company's growth implied that similar trade ventures operating under this
organization would see similar success. Furthermore, the benefits conferred upon the
joint stock corporations, such as those later experienced by the Muscovy Company acted
to enhance their already successful organization. The Crown's role was not as vitally
important as was suggested by Fergusson, as well as those in the similar school of
thought.

3.2.

East India Company
Historical accounts of the East India Company were pieced together similar to

those of the other joint stock corporations. Neglect and natural disaster took a toll on
record books and journals from the initial voyages.

From the disorganized and

inconsistent data available, the records appeared "to have been preserved by accident, the
series, though valuable and important as far as it extends, is not continuous" (Danvers
and Fosters 2).
The East India Company was one of the emerging trade companies at the time of
the repeal of England's restrictive trade laws.

In the late 1500s, the East India
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Company's documented records were written in the same minute books as the Levant
Company, which suggested that it was an "outgrowth of the Levant Company" (Stevens
viii). Chartered in 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I, East India Company became the third
largest business in England by 1717 (Baskin and Miranti 56). The charter granted the
East India Company exclusive privileges in trade for fifteen years (Danvers and Foster
xxxii). Fundamental to their success in the eighteenth century was the relaxed trade laws
and the joint stock nature of their establishment.
Its beginnings as a regulated company, and eventual evolution into a joint stock
company was evidence of the unique qualifications of the structure of the joint stock
company as an independent force. Failed attempts at being a purely regulated company
with expeditions funded by one source led to the East India Company's transformation
into a joint stock company.

The company's leadership also crucially assisted in its

transition towards being a permanent joint stock company.
Many members of the East India Company's board were also prominent members
of the Levant Company.

The Levant Company, chartered around the time as the

Muscovy Company, was one of the first joint stock companies. The Levant Company's
success and the success of the Muscovy Company, afforded by the joint stock's structure,
helped to encourage the East India Company's transition into a permanent joint stock
venture.
The East India Company emerged as a mechanism for England to reap its "fair

share in the East Indian trade" (Danvers and Foster xxi). This occurrence was marked by
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Queen Elizabeth sending "William Harburn5, an English Merchant to Turkey, who
obtained from Sultan Amurah III. Permission for English Merchants to resort and trade
to that country, in all aspects as freely as the French, Venetians, Germans, and Poles then
did" (Danvers and Foster xxi).
In October 1589, three vessels embarked on this journey (Danvers and Foster
xxii). This trip "although failed to realize the expected return for their investments, the
practicality of the scheme had been proved and others were thereby encouraged to
embark in a similar enterprise" (Danvers and Foster xxii).

The loss incurred was

insignificant since it was spread across multiple shareholders. The reduced risks and loss
for each contributor encouraged continued investments in future trade ventures. The
reduction in risks and loss to each investor served to increase the benefits from overseas
expeditions. Benefits from overseas trade that outweighed the costs stimulated continued
contributions for other long term trade ventures. The sustained effort to establish a trade
route to India eventually led to several successful enterprises, under the command of Sir
James Lancaster and George, Earl of Cumberland. Sir James Lancaster and George, Earl
of Cumberland were two of the many prominent merchants, and members of the Queen's
court, who were involved in the initial trade expeditions to India.
The early expeditions were marked as separate voyages "for each of which a
separate capital was generally raised, and the subscribers bore the entire expense and
reaped the whole of the profits" (Danvers and Foster xxiii).

This form of capital

investment proved to be an inconvenience since the risks were significant for each
5

Homans & Dana (1841: 499) William Harburn was a prominent merchant and ambassador to the Queen at
the Court of Constantinople. -

45

investor. When the first several of vessels failed to return a single investor lost his entire
investment in that venture. After a few failed attempts, wealthy merchants became
hesitant to invest their assets for future expeditions.
Failure to raise sufficient capital for overseas voyages prevented the East India
Company from establishing a trade route.

The East India Company's initial failed

attempts at establishing a trade route to India created a large loss for the individual
contributors of those voyages. This created challenges for securing future funding.
Given the East India Company's unstable beginnings, the risk of failure was
significant. Whether the voyage was funded by a single entrepreneur or by multiple
merchants, investments in a single voyage for the East India Company's overseas venture
came at a high cost. Having multiple contributors reduced the risk by spreading it across
multiple shareholders. Nonetheless, investing in a single voyage was risky.
The failures at the time can be attributed to the unknown terrain and merchants
defaulting on their contractual obligations. Many regions were unexplored, and the
unexplored nations of these trade routes posed a challenge in terms of the potential
dangers that may be encountered. To invest in a one time voyage would still be costly for
each investor.

Engaging in a permanent joint stock partnership would increase the

likelihood of profits from the investment. In this regard, the permanent membership
organization of the East India Company provided many benefits. One benefit included
the perpetual existence afforded by permanent funds contributed towards a permanent

business venture.

This allowed for adequate capital to be raised towards multiple
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expeditions, rather than just a single voyage.

The increasing number of trips also

increased the opportunity for earning returns on the investment.
The charter given to the East India Company granted monopoly privileges and
authority to enforce contracts. However, one crucial impediment to the authority outlined
in the charter was that there was no effective way for the company itself to enforce
contracts terms. Failure to enforce contracts led the company to be in default of £7,000.
The Lords of the Privey Council had the "special powers to deal with those that shewe
themselves remisse and unwilling furnyshe there promyssed contributions" (Stevens 8).
This inability to enforce transaction terms was another shortcoming of the royal charter.
Incentives for profit served as a better tool for regulating and enforcing contracts.
Great financial opportunities for wealth could only be obtained from repeated
transactions.

This component, more so than external governance, could motivate a

merchant to comply with his contractual obligations. Failure to comply creates distrust,
since reneging was not regarded in a positive light. Once a merchant earned a bad
reputation, it would be challenging to find future business partners. This would cause the
non-complier to lose future opportunities for wealth. In this time of extensive growth, the
prospect of losing possible future profit opportunities was too high of a cost for many
merchants to bear. Since the benefit is great, and the cost even greater, opportunities for
wealth act as an effective regulator and enforcer of contractual obligations.
A typical expedition in the East India Company was supplied with "stores and

provisions of all kinds, as well as merchandise, and merchants were appointed to the
different ships to superintend the trade operations" (Danvers and Foster 23). Aside from
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these items, each vessel also stored valuable gifts and letters from the Queen requesting
for open trade to be given to kings and prominent statesmen in any countries that these
ships may encounter. Several letters were left un-addressed to account for the unknown
countries to which these expeditions may venture. Merchandise typical of trade voyages
to India included "iron, tin (wrought and unwrought in bars), lead, and different kinds of
cloths, including Devonshire Kersies, Hamshires of all colours and Norwich stuff
(Danvers and Foster 24). Exported and imported merchandise changed from time to
time.

Later voyages included the exportation of wool, cloth, metals and coarser

manufacturers.

Some examples of commodities that were imported included spices,

cotton, perfumes, precious stones, indigo, silk and rare wood (Herrick 216).
In 1609 the trade with India became widely established. With the end of the
exclusive trade privileges approaching, the East India Company focused its attention to
renewing the charter in addition to its established trade to India. The King, seeing the
profitable operations of the East India Company granted them "the whole, entire, and
only trade and traffic to the East Indies' [for ever]". If trade became unprofitable, "these
exclusive privileges were to cease and determine after three years' warning" (Danvers
and Foster 32). The privileges outlined here suggested a business relationship between
the Crown and the East India Company. Beyond the business relationship, the East India
Company was a vital source of the Crown's revenues.
The privileges granted to the East India Company did not completely restrict other

merchants from seeking a share of this profitable undertaking. Other companies wishing
to partake in this gainful trade venture were allowed to do so only under the company's
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seal. This opened additional opportunities for merchants in England to seek a fair share
in trade with the East Indies.

One possible way in which other merchants could

participate was by purchasing stock in the company. Each shareholder seeking to earn a
fair share of the profits successfully contributed to the company's growth. In 1717, the
East India Company's "nominal values of its shares were £3. 2 million" (Baskin and
Miranti 56). At the zenith of its growth, the East India Company was the third largest
business in England, "which was exceeded only that of the ill-fated South Sea Company
(£10 million) and the Bank of England (£5. 6 million)" (Baskin and Miranti 56).

3.3.

Virginia Company
The Virginia Company incorporated the commercial and political qualities of

business in England that made it a prominent example among the joint stock corporation
of this time. Similar to other joint stock corporations, its records are not complete.
However, much of its remaining history has been carefully preserved. Research on the
Virginia Company has been drawn from "the manuscript records of the Company, the
history of the preservation of which for about two hundred and fifty years is full of
interest" (Neill 3).
In 1606, the Virginia Company acquired a royal charter and became incorporated
(Bucholz 191). Its orientation can be attributed to the Crown as the charter established
the Virginia Company as a regulated company.
In its first three years of incorporation, the Virginia Company was a joint stock
corporation that operated under the strict guidance of the king. In this regard, he acted as
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the board of governors acting on the behalf of all the investors. Therefore, the investors'
role therefore was solely for the purpose "of raising funds, furnishing the supplies, and
sending out the expeditions" (Kingsbury 11). However, this form of management proved
to be inefficient and later caused the company to disband".
The Virginia Company later emerged and "became distinctly proprietary,
retaining the commercial responsibilities, but assuming governmental functions in place
of the king" (Kingsbury 11). This organizational structure was found in the joint stock
model.

Although the charter emphasized the role of the government, "the Virginia

Company was purely a commercial enterprise conducted by a private concern, even
before the charter of 1609, as is shown by the history of its early years" (Kingsbury 12).
The focus on the Crown's involvement was attributed to it being "backed by the
patronage of the King" (Kingsbury 12). The King's role in the company was "only for
the purpose of advancing the trade of the Kingdom in foreign parts and saving the Crown
from expense and responsibility, as had been the policy in regard to other trading
companies" (Kingsbury 12).
Although the company was established in a regulated form, the Virginia Company
operated from individual contributions, this quality alone does not make the Virginia
Company a joint stock venture. The Virginia Company showed a gradual progress
towards becoming a joint stock corporation. This was initiated by their reincorporation
as a regulated company under a proprietary leadership.

In 1612 "increasing the importance of the directors and investing sums for a
limited period it became a joint stock company" (Kingsbury 13). Its leadership was no
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longer in the hands of a single authority. Instead, a group of individuals acted as the
board of governors. Having multiple individuals represent the group provided efficient
communication of the goals of the shareholders. Each member of the board of governors
acted as a check and balance for the other in representing multiple perspectives on
operating a merchant company. This is vastly different from the leadership under the
sole discretion of the king.

The king's management of the first Virginia Company

demonstrated that simply having the Crown's involvement alone was insufficient to
foster a thriving company. The Crown may have great authority, but that does not make
a keen businessman.
The experiences contributed by the numerous investors and distilled to the board
of governors gave the Virginia Company the necessary leadership to thrive.

Many

investors of "the Virginia Company were men who had taken part in the expeditions of
the late sixteenth century and had been interested in certain private voyages of
exploration carried during the five years preceding the receipt of its first charter"
(Kingsbury 14). Having been involved in many other profit-seeking expeditions, its
members carried valuable experiences that served as a powerful defense against the
unknown risks inherent in overseas voyages.
The Virginia Company as well as other notable joint stock trading companies
were originally organized to export wool. However, "in order to maintain profitability
they often found it necessary to export fish, tin, or when all else failed, gold in return for

lucrative commodities like silks, spices, and later, tea" (Bucholz 191). The company
distinguished itself in the business of "gold mining but later specialized in Tobacco"
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(Bucholz 191). As the company continued its operations and realized increasing profits,
the Crown took more interest in the company. The most outward attempt at profitseeking was illustrated by the king's growing interest "when the tobacco trade promised
revenue to the Crown" (Kingsbury 15).
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4.

CONCLUSION
The joint stock corporation which has become an important form of business

structure in modern commercial activities is the result of a long development.
business development was first documented in the Middle Ages.

This

The Commenda

Contract in the Middle Ages was the predecessor to the Tudor and modern joint stock
corporation.
Joint stock partnerships whether legally incorporated or informally organized, had
the unique quality of providing its investors with a profitable return.

It was not

uncommon for investors in joint stock companies to receive "30 percent on their money"
(Spielvogel 401). This alone provided enough incentives for merchants to consolidate
resources to take stock in a joint trade venture.
The growth in trade in England in the seventeenth-century coincided with the
Crown's political struggle with other nations. This struggle led to increasing levels of
government expenditures. Income tax and other revenue extraction schemes created by
the state were unable to support the growing expenditures. As private trade developed
and flourished in England, the Crown saw this as an opportunity for raising funds. Royal
Charters were created with motivations for earning more revenues.

The Crown

established royal charters to share in profits from trade. Observations on the environment
surrounding the formation of the Muscovy Company, the East India Company and the
Virginia Company demonstrated the Crown's late involvement in each company's
success.
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The crown's interest peaked after these companies achieved success. In all three
joint stock companies, the Crown's late involvement implied that their involvement was
not the enabling factor. This supports the hypothesis that the state did not have a pivotal
role in enabling markets. The modern western joint stock corporation evolved from
companies that operated with the Commenda Agreement and the joint stock associations
of the Tudor period. By association, the state therefore is not responsible for enabling the
modern commerce.
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